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In the Supreme Court of the State of Utah
THE STA'l'E OF U'rAH,
Plaintif!-Respondent,
- vs. -

Case No.
11733

GERALD SCANDRET'l\
Defendant-Appellant.

BRIF-F OF APPELLANT
S'l'ATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE
Appellant appeals from his conviction in the Third
Judicial District Court, Honorable .Merrill C. Faux,
Judge, presiding, of the crime of Murder in the Second
Degree.
DISPOSI'rION IN THE LOWER COURT
Appellant was originally charged ·with Murder rn
the First Dt>gree, in violation of 76-30-1, Utah Code
Annotated, 1953. Prior to the trial, appellant discovered
(R. 19) that the in·osecntion intended to rely upon certain statenwnts and admissions which were made by
a1>11ellant during his interrogation. Appellant moved to
suppress the (•\-idence (R. 2G) on the ground that there
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had been no valid waiver of appellant's constitutional
right to remain silent and to have the assistance of
counsel. After a hearing, Judge Faux denied the motion
to suppress.
On March 25, 1969, the trial was held before Judge
Faux. Appellant pleaded not guilty to a reduced charge
of :Murder in the Second Degree. Upon a hearing of
the evidence, as stipulated by the prosecution and defense, Judge Faux found Gerald Scandrett guilty of
Murder in the Second Degree.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The appellant seeks a reversal of appellant's conviction in the Third ·Judicial District Court.
,r

•

IH' .... • -

.,.,

STATEMEN11 OF FACTS
On November 8, 1968, the appellant, Gerald Scandrett, \vas in the ninth day of continuous drinking of
intoxicating liquors. During this period he had consumed an inordinate amonnt of liquor and on November
Sth he had been drinking a high-alcohol content Tokay
\Vine. His entire food intake during November 8 was a
half of a bacon sandwich consumed at approximately

10:15 A.M. (R. 52-53).

3At approximately 5 :00 P.M. on November 8th, a
stabbing occurred in appellant's hotel room. Present in
the room were the appellant, the appellant's drinking
eompanion, Quimby Ferguson, ·who ·was also in a highly
intoxicated condition, and Tony Trujillo, the victim of
the stabbing. About five minutes after the stabbing
appellant notified the desk clerk that the police should
lJe called. Dnring the fin minutes which elapsed between the stabbing and tht> notification of the desk
(']erk, the appellanteonsumt>dmorewine (R. 55).
A few minutes after 5 :00 P ..ThL the police arrived
and appellant was placed under arrest (R. 107). He was
taken to police headquarters and at 5 :50 P.M. a tape
recording was made of his intc->rrogation (R. 109). The
first part of the interrogation was an involved attempt
to explain the elements of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S.
43G (1966), to the appellant (R. 93-94).
Thereafter, appellant supposedly waived his constitutional rights to remain silent and to assistance of
counsel (R. 94). Thereafter, appellant made self-incrimina ting statemt>nts and admissions.
The interrogation ·was conclnded one hour and 30
minutes after appellant's last drink. At that time a blood
alcohol test ·was administered. Tlw City Chemist reported that at 6 :30 P.M. appellant's blood alcohol level
was .2GO ( R. 70-71 ) .
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ARGUMENT
POINT I
APPELLANT'S ADVANCED ST ATE OF INTOXICATION RESULTED IN AN IMPAIRMENT OF HIS
MENTAL FACULTIES WHICH RENDERED HIM
IN CAP ABLE OF A "KNOWING AND INTELLIGENT" WAIVER OF HIS CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT
TO ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL

In Miranda v. Ari.zona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), the
Supreme Court of the United States laid down specific
rules regarding the admissibility of statemPnts obtained
from an individual who is subjected to custodial police
interrogation. As t\. constitutional prerequisite to the
admissibility of snch statements, the suspect must be
warned, prior to questioning, that he has a right to
remain silent, that any statement he does make may be
used against him, and that he has a right to the immediate presence of counsel and if he cannot afford
counsel, counsel will be provided for him without expense.
If the defendant chooses to make a statement without

exercising his constitutional rights it must be shown that
he made a clear intelligent waiver of those guaranteed
rights.
A heavy burden rests upon the state to show that a
valid constitutional waiver was made.

5
"If the interrogation continues without the
presence of an attorney and a statement is taken,
a heavy bitrden rests on the govet'nment to demonstrate that the defendant knowingly and intelligently waived his privilege against self-incrimination and his right to retained or appointed
counsel." 384 U.S. at 475. (Emphasis added.)

Appellant contends that his highly intoxicated condition at the time of questioning made it impossible for
him to make a "knowing and intelligent" waiver of his
constitutional rights.
In Logner v. State of North Carolirw, 260 F. Supp.
970 (M.D. N.C. 196G), it was established that when a
defendant is intoxicated to a degree which in1pairs his
judgment, an attempt to waive his constitutional rights
is ineffectual. In Log•ner, the defendant had been drinking heavily and had been taking amphetamines. The
police noted that "he wasn't walking like a sober man,"
but they did not believe that he was drunk enough to
be arrested for public drunkenness. Upon closer observation the police discovered that the defendant was
"obviously drunk." The alleged waiver of his constitutional rights was embodied in the remark "I can tell
you anything I want to. You still have to prove it." In
ruling that there was no valid waiver, the court said:
"The accused may always waive his rights,
but this waiver must be made voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently.
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However, no snch waiyer can be said to have
taken place in this case. The petitioner in his
condition was incapable of acting knowingly or
intelLlgently. Once in custody and when the investigation had focused on the petitioner as the
accused, at that moment a cloak of constitntional rights enveloped the petitioner. This cloak
conld only be removed by some affirmative
action on the part of the petitioner and at the
time the petitioner ·was incapable of any affirmative action. E1Jen though the vctitio11rr in his
-intoxicated state might attempt to 1raive his co11stitntiona.l right to remain silent or to hare
counsel, the u;aiver ico11ld have to l;e i11Pffect11nl
brcause the petitionn's ,judgment iras impaired.
To waive his constitutional rights, the petitioner
must be capable of doing so in a voluntary, knowing, aYid intelligc>nt manner. The petitioner was
not in that position." 2o0 F. fiupp. at 977.
The critical issue before this Conrt is whether the
appellant, Gerald Scandrett, was in such a state of
intoxication that his judgment was impaired. If it can
be sho,\'11 that there was an appreciable impairment of
appellant's mental faculties at the time of the alleged
wain'r of his constitutional rights, this court must hold
that the confession was inadmissible, and reverse the
judgment of the lower conrt. Carnley v. Cochran, 369
U.S. 506 (1962); Glasser 'I.'.
States, 315 U.S. 60
(1942).
The rerord sho-\VS that at

(j

:30 P.1\1. on l\ovember 8,

one hour and thirty minutes after appellant's last drink, a
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blood-alcohol test was administered and appellant showed
a lewl of .2GO (R. 69-70). A conservatin estimate of
tlw blood-alcohol level at
time of the arrest and
intenogation ,,·as placed at .282 (R. 71). The only
l'Yidl•nce before the lower court on this issue was the
testimony of D1·. Stt>wart Haryey, a pharmacologist ·who
had done extensi,·e n•s<>arch in the arPa of blood-alcohol
lr\·els and tlw effect of alcohol upon body metabolism
and nwntal faculties. Dr. Harwy testified as follows
n•s1H·etinµ: tlw ability of the ap1wllant to rnake judgments:
"My opinion is, this individual would be impaired in his ahilit>· to iwrceiye the consequences
of any responses that are elicite>d hy questioning
of the officPr ... and the fact that an alcoholic
or iwrnon undt>r the inflneneP of alcohol ... will
rlo things nmlPr tJw inflnenrP of alcohol that
are detrimental to himself and to his ·well-being,
indieates that a person undPr the influence, is
of aeting, intelligentl>·, in his selfinterest, whether it is behind the ·wheel or in
responsp to questioning· - and situations of this
sort.

Q.

And would it hr- your judgment, then, that,
at the level of (point).26 - that is you are
basing this answer upon the point .26 level;
is that COITPet7

A.

T am basing it on any lPYel ahon• (point)
Kow, the exaet ext<>nt of the impairment
(point) .2(i, I am unable to say, Pxeept
would lw C'Onsideralily higher than level

.1.
at
it
of
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(point) .1, above which all experts in this
field are agreed, there is some impairment."
(R. Rl-R2).
The prosecution did not call
exrwrt witnesses
to contradict Dr. Harvey's testimony. His tPstimony
was ce1iainly sufficient to establish that
appellant's
judgnwnt \ms considL•rably impaired at the time of his
alleged wain•r, and a "knowing and intelligent" waiver
in the true spirit of Miranda was
Ample snp1Jort for the validity of Dr.
testimony can he' found in cmTent rnedical l'Psearch and wTitings. Ho\YeYer, the most rwrtinent statellwnt is fonnd
in
(ed.) : Alcolwl Rducatio11 for Classroom and
Comm unity,
Hill, Kvw York, 19G4. In an article
entitled "The RPSIJOnsc• of tlw Body to Diff<>rent Concentrations of Alcohol: Chemical Tests for lntoxication,''
the effect of alcohol on brain functions is discussed. The
condusion in this area was that deterioration of judgment and self-control was
first symptom of intoxication.
"These [.judgment and self-control] represent
the highest functions of the brain, and impairment
begins 1'ith concentrations of alcohol below those
which \\ill cause iimseular incoordination." Id.
at
It is ::-:ignificant that .Judg<' F"aux arrived at his decision to drny the appellant's motion to suppress because of
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the absence of halting s1wech or slurring by the appellant
as evidencPd b)' the tape recording (R. 99). This alone
is hardly conclusive evidence, especially when weighed
against the previous testimony of Dr. Harvey (R. 88-89).
Snpport for this argument is in Forrester: Chemical
Tests for Alcohol in Traffic Law Enforcement, Charles
C. Thomas, Springfield, Illinois, 1950. Although the
writer ·was focusing on the issue of blood alcohol level
and its relation to driving ahilit)', the following statements ar<' highly rC'levant to tlw case at hand:
'·The qlwstion fr<•quc>ntly arises whether there
arc some drivers so little affectc:>d by alcohol that
it reqnirPs more than .15% of blood alcohol to
lower their driving ability. Many tests han' failed
to find such a person. A few do not ::,;tagger or
e.r!zilJit thick speech wdil the blood alcohol reaches
perhaps .25</'c but all the heavy drinkers tested
have shown definite .loivering in drii ing and other
skills when the blood alcohol reached .15o/o. In
fact all ·were somewhat adnrsely affected when
he blood alcohol was above .10%. Judgment is
the first body faculty to be affected by alcohol.
Id. at 28-29. (Emphasis added.)
0

Appellant submits that the motion to suppress evidence should have been granted
J ndge Faux. The
State had a "heavy burden" of proof to show that the
·waiv<•r was made '·intelligently and knowingly," and it
has failed to sustain that bnrden. In Jliranda, the court
was t•mphatic in placing
lrnrden of proof upon the
state:
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" ... a heavy burden rests on the government
to demonstrate that the defendant knowingly and
intelligently waived his privilege against selfincrimination and his right to retained or appointed counsel. This court has always set high
standards of proof for the waiver of constitutional
rights, and we reassert these standards as applied
to in custody interrogation." 384 U.S. at 475.
Dr. Stewart Harvey presented expert testimony in
support of appellant's contention that an "intelligent
and knowing" -.,rniver was impossible in his intoxicated
condition. The state did not elect to rebut Dr. Harvey's
testimony with contrary expert testimony. The state
relied only upon cross-examination by the District Attorney in an effort to discredit Dr. Harvey's testimony.
Tlwrefore, the state has not sho-.,vn that thc•re was a
valid waiver of appellant's constitutional rights, and thus
the denial of appellant's motion to suppress was a reversible error.
In cases decided decades berore Miranda the Supreme Court defined the qualitative standard a trial
court judge should follow in a situation where a defendant wished to waive his constitutional right to counsel
at trial. Possibly the most definitive description of the
quality of waiver necessary to relinquish tlLis constitutional right is found in Von M oltkP v. Gillies, 332 U.S.
708 (1948) where Justice Black described the extent of
a judge's duty:
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''To discharge this duty properly in light of
the strong presumption against waiver of the constitutional right to counsel, a judge must investigate as long and as thoroughly as the circumstances of the case before him demand. The fact
that an accused mav tell him that he is informed
of his right to
and desires to waive this
right does not automatically end the judge's
responsibility. To be valid such waiver must be
made ,,·ith an apprehension of the nature of the
charges, the statutory offenses included ·within
them, the range of allowable punishments thereunder, possible ddenses to the charges and circumstances in mitigation thereof, and all other
facts essential to a broad understanding of the
whole matt<•r." 332 F.S. at 723-24.
It is not appl'llant's contt>ntion that th<.• duty pbc<.'d on
judges hy ron Jfolfke lllUSt llPCessarily he PXknded in
entirety to interrogating police officers by Mir([Jnda, but
it is contended that whether at trial or during questioning it is equally important that the standards for waiver
should be at very least similar since the same reasons
for caution are present. Appellant considers it significant that the Supn'me Court, in defining the quality of
waiver necessary under Miranda, cites and quotes from
an earlier case, Carnley v. Cochran, 3G9 U.S. 506 (1962):

''The record must show, or there must be an
allE'gation and evidence which show, that an accused was offered counsel hut intelligently and
understandingly rPjected the off er. Anything less
is not waiwr."
U.S. at 51fi.
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The problem of the "voluntary, knowing and intelligent" waiver has not escaped the attrntion of legal
scholars and writers. Indeed many han' proposed standards far more broad than the narrow ruling ar)pellant
requests this court to make. Richard Kuh in ''Some
Views on Miranda v. Arizona," 35 Fordham L. Rev. 233
(] 9GG) contends:
''Putting these rt'latively rare situations ont
of thP way and turning to the far more common
situation of someone taken into custody involuntaril)·, and not :,.;hre·wdly advised by his lawyer, l
would like to explore my reasons for stating there
is rarely snch a thing as an intelligent, voluntary
wain•r." at 23:L
"If . . . the defrndant does \\·aiw and say
that he \Yants to talk, then he talks for either of
two reason:,.;: ( 1) he did not understand the whole
"formula," and, if he did not understand it, there
is a "waiver" that was made without an understanding of the warning; such an alleged \vaiver
is a nullity; or (2) although he understood the
warning, he still wcwtl'd to waive . . . . [A] syllogism demonstrates the inYalidity of this waiver.
The major premise is: To hurt oneself intentionally is not intPlligent, but is StU}Jid. rrhe minor
premise is: a defendant, 1\'110 with knmYledge that
lte can only hurt himself by talking, talks, inh•ntionally hurts himself. The conclnsion is: His
act in talking intentionally is a stupid, non-intelligt>nt act." at 234-;J.
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rrhe reportt'rs of the ABA Project on Minimum Standards for Criminal Justice, Standards Relating to Providing Defense Services 7.3 (Tent. Draft 19G7) reached
the following conclusion:
''If a person ·who has not
a la'""'Ye'r indicates his intention to waive the assistance of counsel, a la'""'Yer should he provided to consult with
him. No waiver shonld he accepted unless he has
at 1Past oncP conf Prred with a lawyer."

Ohvionsly, thl• trn(• nwaning of "knowingly and intdligent1y'' mnst li<> somewhere hetween the idealistic
realm of the lPgal theorists and the ritualistic lip service
giYen hy many courts. Many courts appear to ignore
rathPr than interpret "knowing]_\' and intPllig0ntly." The
Conrt of Criminal Appeals of Texas in Graywn v. State,
438 S.vV. 2d 553 (Tex. App. 19G9) affirmed a conviction
of murder. The defendant, a fifty year old man, was
deemed to have waived his right to remain silent and
to the assistance of counsel even though a psychologist
and a psychiatrist testified that the defendant had an
f.Q. of ;)1 and classifiPd him as a low grade moron. The
psychiatrist testified that it was his opinion that the
defendant was not as intelligent as a normal three or
four year old child and that "on
rare occasions [he
had] seen people as senrel,\· retarded as this man walking on tlH• streets.'' SnrPly if this "·a:; the type of qualitatiYe standard intended

the Su1ff(•me Court in Mi-

rnnda, th('Y would not have used the phrase "knowingly
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and intelligently." Appellant does not contend that every
police station mnst have a la\\·yer or that onl.'· pt'I'sons
of ad,·anced lt•gal Pdncation may wain:• their constitutional rights.

Appellant does contend that the term

''knowingly and iut('lligPntly" means, if it is to mz'an
anything at all, that constitutional rights, one of the
most preeious gifts of our society, cannot be waived by
drunks, morons, and infants.
An t:•xamplt• of a proJH'r imple11w11tation of the
.lli rr111da rule was shown in a recent decision by Judge J.

Fauntleroy of the J uwnile Court of the District of Columbia. In the

of a Youth Charged icith Honiicide,

\rash. D.C . .J.C. Ko. G9--±4<i0-.J (No,-. 18, l9GD) involv0d
a lG year-old yontli \\·ho had supposedly waived his right
to counsel and made a Yoluntary confession of firstdegree murder. Judge Fauntleroy suppressed the evidence of the confession and held that a juvenne is unable

to wai w• his right to counsel. The rationale of the dE•cision was that a youth does not have the maturity to waive
:rnch an important right. Such a holding is a true interpretation of thP principle of the Miranda decision. A 16
year old yonth is not capal1le of a "lrnowing and intelligent" wainr of his constitutional rights, for his jnd.L,rnwnt
is impairt•d h:-· immaturit.'·; and a drnnken adult is not
eapahle of a "knowing and intelligent wain•r, for his judgnwnt i:s impain•d by intoxication."
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POINT II
APPELLANT DID NOT "KNOWINGLY AND INTELLIGENTLY" WAIVE HIS CONSTITUTIONAL
RIGHT TO APPOINTED COUNSEL DURING QUESTIONING, BECAUSE APPELLANT DID ATTEMPT,
IN A CONFUSED AND GROPING MANNER, TO
EXERCISE THAT RIGHT AND THE ATTEMPT
WAS IGNORED BY INTERROGATING OFFICERS.

The Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments of the Constitution of the United States, as interpreted by the
Supreme Court in Miranda

'l'.

Ari.zoua, 384 U.S. 436

(1966), guarantees an accused the right to appointed
counsel during custodial interrogation.

Appellant at-

tempted to exercise this constitutional right. His admittedly confused and imprecise request was ignored by
the interrogating officers. Appellant was scared. A violent crime, policemen, excited onlookers, arrest, the police
station, questions-any man, guilty or innocent, would be
confused and frightened in that situa6on.
The tape recording of appellant's interrogation as
reported in the trial transcript reveals the following exchange on lines 29 of page 93 through 14 of page 94:
"29. Officer: ''Right; you have a right to talk to
an attorney and have a
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30. right to have him present during questioning."

1. Appellant: "I don't have an attorney, but I'll
have to get one, looks
2. like, don't it?"
3. Officer: "Well if you can't afford an attorney, one will be obtained

±. for you at no expense to you."
5. Appellant: "Well, I'll get one from the Marine Corps, or try to get one

6. from the Marine Corps that will defend me.
I don't know which one

7. I ought to get, yet."
8. Officer: "Well, if you can't afford one, the
State will retain one."
9. Appellant: "One of these will have to; I won't
want the Marine Corps
10. 'cause I didn't mean to kill the man and if he
dies, I'm gonna be
11. the son-of-a-bitch that's gonna take it; now,
I'm gonna be
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12. the son-of-a-bikh that suffers, and I'll admit
j t."

13. Officer: "Now, do you understand all these
rights?"
14. Appellant: "Yes, sir; I understand."
In lines 1 and 2 appellant 'Said " ... I'll have to get
one, looks like don't it?" This statement is evidence of
a confused impaired mind trying to grasp a totally overwhelming situation. It is an aborted attempt at exercising a right and gives further testimony of lack of understanding in that it refers to the future, possibly at trial,
not the present. In line five the appellant says " ... I'll
get one from the Marine Corps, ... " ·what prompted
appellant to ref er to a Marine Corps lawyer when he
was a Navy
Possibly the Marine Corps was a
part of some drunken fantasy or brag, but certainly it
was not part of a "knowing and intelligent" attempt to
protect appellant's interests. In lines 6 and 7 appellant
says "I don't know which one I ought to get, yet." Here
the appellant clearly shows that he wants a lawyer.
Granted appellant did not specifically and unequivocally
demand an attorney, but the meaning was there for the
interrogating officers had they wanted to follow the
spirit and meaning of Miranda rather than trying to
thread their way between the literal minimum boundaries
of that opinion. The request was made but the interrogating officers ignored it because they knew they could
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change and dfrect ap1wllant's train of thought away from
this riglit, and could with patience• obtain an affirrnatin• answer to the quPstion finally posed in line 13.
Clearly, in the dialogue c•xarnined, ap1wllant attPmpted to exPrcise his right to counsPl: a right appellant didn't understand, Iiad Iwn•r had explained to him
in a non-fiction situation, and whirh 1rns heing couched
in language which could only further confuse him. Only
onre was appellant told Jw had a rig-ht to counsel during
questioning and there was no mention of the fact that
appointed,

frflp

counsel 1rns ayailahlP to him at that

timP. Appointed coum;e], as opposed to retained counsPl, is mentioned in lines 4 and 5, where the officer stated
•'\Vdl, if you can't afford an attorney, one irill be obtained for you ... " By this statement the officer implies
that free counsel is not no"· available but ·will be provided later. "vVilI" is not a vrnrd of the present, it refers
to the future: tomorrow, next week, at trial, even after
yon have talkd to us, but not right now.
ThP manm"'r in which aprwllant's rights \\·ere explained to him and the manner in which his attempted
request for immediate rounsd werP passed over, led appdllant to tJw conclusion that he had a right to retain
counsel during, which lw conkl not afford, and appointed
eounsel for for thP purposP of trial.
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An accused is not required to state and demand his
rights in precise constitntional terminology. He need
only <'Xpress his desire for counsel. It is clc>arly stated
in M ira·nda:

"The defendant mav waive effectuation of
these rights, provided tl{e waiver is made voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently. If, however,
he indicates in any manner and at any stage of
the process that he wishes to consult with an
attorney before speaking there can be no questioning." 384 U.S. at 444-45 (emphasis added).
This portion of the Miranda opinion was the basis for
the holding made in State v. Word, 456 P.2d 210 (N.M.
App. 1969). There the conrt of appeals reversed a
;.;econd degree murder conviction on the grounds that
appellant's conviction was based, in whole or in part,
on a confession obtained after the defendant had been
deprived of his constitutional right to assistance of counsel. The defendant never made the direct statement "I
>rnnt a lawyer." Defendant did give indications of wanting a lawyer, but each time the prosecutor "by indirection" circmnvented the issue. The court cited the language in Miranda "If he indicates in any manner and
at any stage of the process that he wishes to consult
with an attorney before speaking there can be no questioning," and then stated that "tlw law officers cannot
ayoid this directi\'e nor should they attempt by direction
or indirection, to dissnade a defendant from consulting
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an attorney." 45G P.2d at 212. In the case at hand the
interrogating officers turned by dir<>ction, appellant's
already confused, and drunken train of thought away
from the task of undPrstanding and utilizing his right
to counsel.
POINT III
APPELLANT'S ADVANCED STATE OF INTOXICATION RENDERED HIS CONFESSION "INVOLUNTARY," AND BECAUSE THE CONFESSION WAS
ADMITTED INTO EVIDENCE, THE APPELLANT'S
CONVICTION l\fUST BE REVERSED.

The Fifth Amendment of the Constitution of the
United States provides that no person "shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself." This constitutional mandate has been formulated
into the rule that convictions following the admission
into evidence of confessions which are involuntary, i.t>.,
the product of coercion, either physical or psychological,
cannot stand. If such a confession ·which offends due
process fonns any part of the basis for a criminal conviction, then the conviction cannot stand "even though
there is ample evidence asid(, from the confession to
support the conviction." Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368
(1964). The rule was ap1)Iied to the states in Malloy v.
Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (19G-1),

the court stated:
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"The Fonrt<"enth Amendment secures against
state invasion the same privilege that the Fifth
Amendment guarantees against frderal infringl'ment - the right of a person to rPrnain silent
unless he chooses to speak in the nnfetter<:.d exercise of his own "'ill. .. " 378 F.S. at 8.
rrhe standard of voluntariness has developed into a
policy of restdcting the admissibility of any confession
obtained by questionable practices or under questionable>
arren said in TownC'ircumstances. As Chief Justice
send v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293 (19G3), "If an individual's will
was ov0rborne or if his confession was not the product
of a rational intellect and a 'free will' his confession
is inadmissible because coerced." Id. at 307.
A confession made by one in the appellant's ad,·anced state of intoxication could not be the product
of a rational intellect and a free will. It has been shown
that any person with a .260 blood alcohol level would
suffer an appreciable impairment of his mental faculties, especially his judgment and reason. A person who
had lost control of his mental faculties is incapable of
making an admissible confession.
In Logner v. State of North Carolina, 260 F. Supp.
970 (N.C.M.D. 1966), the defendant was a chronic alcoholic who had been drinking heavily and had been taking
amphetamines. The court ruled that his confession wa:s
involuntary because his mental faculties were appreci-
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ably impaired by his advanced state of intoxication; "any
decision to incriminate made in the intoxicated state of
petitioner could not be free and unconstrained." The
court reasoned that if the defendant was charged with being under the influence, this would be adequate evidence
that his mental faculties were impaired; and impaired to
an extent which would render any confession "involuntary." In holding the confession "involuntary," the court
stated:
"Was this confession the product of an essentially free and unconstrained choice of its maker?
This Court must answer in the negative .... The
petitioner's will had been overborne by the alcohol and drugs. 'Whether he had a false sense of
confidence ... or an acute sense of remorse, his
capacity for self-determination was critically impaired, rendering any confession gained objectionable." 260 F. Supp. at 976.
There can be no doubt that appellant Gerald Scandrett's capacity for self-determination wa;s critically impaired. The Federal District Court in the Logner case
accepted a charge of driving under the influence as sufficient evidence of a critical impairment. It is significant that in Utah a blood alcohol level of .08 is considered presumptive evidence that the person is under the
influence of intoxicating liquor. Section 41-6-44, Utah
Code Annotated (1969 Supp.). Appellant's blood alcohol
level of .26 was conclusive evidence that he was under
the influence of intoxicating liquors, and thus incapable
of making an admissible confession.
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CONCLUSION
Appellant submits that he did not "knowingly and
intelligently" ·waive his constitutional rights to remain
silent and to assistance of counsel during questioning as
defined in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), because his advanced state of intoxication resulted in an
impairment of his mental faculties which rendered him
incapable of a valid waiver. Furthermore, appellant did
attempt, in a confused and groping manner, to exercise
his constitutional rights, but the attempt was ignored
hy interrogating officers. In addition, appellant contends that any statements made by him during the police
interrogation were inadmissible as evidence since his
hlood alcohol content of .260 caused him to be so intoxicated as to render his statements involuntary; and because the involuntary confession was admitted into evidence appellant's conviction must be reversed.
Based upon the foregoing reasons appellant respectfully submits that appellant's conviction in the Third
Judicial District Court should be reversed.
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